WWII- Cliffs notes on various topics

Andras · **Andras**

Development of the US 90mm Tank Gun

In 1942 Ordnance (Ord) began the study of more powerful tank guns even though there was no user requirement from the Army. The potential use of 90mm anti-aircraft guns was spurred by the reported use of German 88mm guns in the anti-tank role. The first attempt, the 90mm GMC T53 mated a 90mm turret to a M4 tank chassis.

At an August 1942 conference, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and Ord agreed to begin production of 500 T53s and planned a further 3,500. However, the T53 proved to be a poor design and Ord realized that the 90mm gun had to be redesigned to be an effective tank gun. In October, 1942 Ord began work on a new T7 90mm gun and its mounting system. One of the 2 pilot guns was mounted on a M10 late in 42. Due to the greater volume of the 90mm cartridge, the standard M10 turret had to be changed, to include power traverse and other improvements.

Gen. Bruce of Tank Destroyer Command (TDC) objected to the design. He felt that the M10 based chassis were too slow, and that the existing 3” gun was sufficient. He was ignored by both Ord and AGF, and TDC continued to be marginalized in future Army decisions due to a history of poor decisions.

Ford took over the design of the new T71 90mm turret, and the first prototype was delivered in Sept 1943. AGF approval for production was won in Oct 1943. The designated hull was the M10A1, which in turn was based on the M4A3. Almost 1200 M10A1s had been built by then, and had been retained in the US for training (4,993 M10s were built for overseas deployment). An additional 520 M10A1 chassis were built Nov 43-Jan 44, the last 300 without turrets.

AGF recommended that the M10 production be terminated and 10 battalions be equipped with T71s. Slight changes were made through January 1944. Conversions of the 300 turretless M10A1s began in Apr 1944 and were completed in July. The requested number of T71s was increased to 600 in May. Also in May, AGF asked ETO US Army command if they wanted any of the new T71s, and were told that there was no need as the M10s were adequate.

The 90mm Tank destroyer was designated M36 on June 1.

On July 6, ETOUSA cabled AGF and asked for every M36 they had, and for all M10 Battalions be converted to M36s as soon as possible. On July 29, the total number of M36s ordered reached 1,400 after the tank fighting in Normandy. Resistance to the M36s evaporated at both the TDC and ETOUSA. 12th Army group requested that of the 52 TD battalions committed to the ETO, 20 become M36, 20 retain M10 or M18, and 12 remain equipped with 3” towed guns.

M36s arrived in France in September 1944, and entered combat in early October. The 90mm gun was a definite improvement, able to penetrate the Panther glacis at up to 500yd, in addition, the powerful 90mm shell could cause the glacis to collapse if struck with multiple non-penetrating shells, and still score a kill. One of the first Panther kills occurred at 1,500 yds, a M36 from the 776th TD Battalion scored 2 hits, one broke the track, and the second entered the turret, blew the breechblock off the 75mm cannon, and blew the top off the turret.

There were 6 M36 battalions in service by January 1945. The Ardennes fighting renewed pressure to field the M36, and convert all towed 3” battalions. In addition, the HVAP 90mm projectile was becoming available.

While the total numbers of German vehicles encountered was going down, the individual vehicles were becoming more heavily armored. A M36 from the 776th encountered an attacking German column including a captured Sherman and two JagdTigers on January 5 1945. The M36 flanked the German vehicles and put a 90mm round into one of the JagdTigers, destroying it. The M36 then destroyed the captured Sherman, and fired HE shells at the accompanying Panzer Grenadiers, driving off the attackers.

From Osprey’s M10 and M36 Tank Destroyers, 1942-53; New Vanguard Series #53

Andras · **Andras**

M4 (76mm) Notes

US Army Ordnance began working on the 76mm gun in early 42 on its own initiative. While there were several 76mm guns already in service, the most likely weapon was the M7 Heavy Tank gun, this gun was too large to fit into a Sherman sized turret. The T1 gun was developed to use the same projectiles, but a smaller case. To avoid confusion, the M7 gun was labeled ’3-inch’ and the new T1 as ‘76mm’. At first the T1 had a barrel 57 calibers long, but this was too long and it was cut back to 52 calibers.

Unfortunately, though the new gun could penetrate almost 1 inch more then the 75mm weapon, it did not offer the same anti-tank performance as other comparable guns. The new gun only had a 3.6lb propellant charge, the Brit 17lbr had almost 9lbs, the 7.5cm German gun had 8.1lbs.

Likely Penetration at 500m
76mm- 116mm
17lb-163m
7.5cm-168mm
After 1944 with improved ammo
76mm-208mm
17lb-256mm
7.5cm-234mm

Several concerns were raised with the gun in other areas- Large muzzle blast and dust cloud, smaller explosive charge in the HE shells, no smoke shells. The Tank Destroyer Battalions were supposed to be the primary offensive anti-tank arm in the US army, and the M4 medium tanks were to fight infantry, artillery, and exploit breakthroughs into the enemy rear. Since the TDs already had the 76mm gun, objections were raised about the unsuitability of the 76mm gun to infantry support missions. During the war, 70% of all tank ammunition fired was HE, 20% AT, and 10% smoke. It was recommended that 1 tank in 3 be armed with the 76mm gun, either one company per battalion, or one platoon per company.

The Brits decided to arm 2 tanks per troop with a 17lbr. They also offered to ship 200/month 17lbr guns to the US for installation on US tanks in Aug 43. Trials between the 17 and the new 90mm gun in March 44 showed that the 17 had better penetration performance then even the new 90mm gun. However by the time these trials took place, 76 and 90mm ammunition was already in production and any new tanks would not be available until after Normandy. Ordnance was also developing new HV ammo for the 90mm gun at that time.

By Normandy, there were 200 76mm armed Shermans in Depots in Britain, but there was no plan to distribute them to the units involved in the invasion. Most of the commanders were reluctant to see the 76mm gun replace the 75mm gun in any significant quantities. While the 75mm could not penetrate the Panthers glacis or mantlet at any range, the 76mm also could not penetrate the glacis at any range, but could pierce the mantlet of the Panther at 200yds. US intelligence did not expect the Panther to be deployed as a Medium tank with the PzIV, but as a heavy tank like the Tiger. The numbers of Panthers encountered in France was a significant shock to the combat arms.

However, by September, the ‘Panther Problem’ appeared to be much less urgent, the US believed that most of the Panthers had been knocked out. A few days later 4 newly formed Panther brigades were crushed conducting a local offensive by 75mm armed tanks due to superior tactics and training on the part of the US forces.

An additional problem was that units were short of tanks across Europe, 335 tanks short of ToE by the end of September. Ordnance was reluctant to switch to a new tank line and worsen the tank shortage.

In August 1944, a new HV round was issued to the existing 76mm units. This round could pierce a Panthers mantlet at 1000yds, but still bounced off the glacis. Production of the tungsten cored ammunition was never able to meet demand and distribution was hardly more then one round per tank per month on average. By February, each 76mm tank had received only 5 rounds of HV on average.

After Ardennes however, there was a marked change in opinion about the 76mm tanks. In January, the 12th Army Group formally requested that no more 75mm Shermans be sent to the ETO and in February stopped bringing 75mm tanks up from repair depots. By April 600 75mm Shermans had accumulated in rear depots. Some of these were sent to Britain to be converted to 17lbrs but never reached the front before the surrender.

2095 76mm armed Shermans were sent to Russia. The M4E2 was a popular tank, called the ‘emcha’, a contraction of M-Chetire (M4 in Russian). The M4 equipped the 1st, 8th, and 9th Guards Mechanized Corps.

Andras · **Andras**

3” M10 and M5 gun Tank Destroyers
cribbed from ‘The Tank Killers’ by Harry Yeide

The unit training center established at Camp Hood trained crews in dismounted tank hunting. Crews of disabled guns were expected to ambush enemy tanks and raid tank parks using small arms, grenades, and mines. Maj Gordon Kimbrell was sent to British Commando school and patterned the dismounted tank hunting tactics on the commando training. Crews were trained in night recon, crossing deep streams, scaling walls, detecting booby traps and mines, street fighting and demolitions.

The 3”/50cal was a potent antitank weapon, the gun could fire 6,000yds directly, and almost 15,000yds indirectly with its 13# HE shell. The M62 APCHE shells could penetrate 3.5” (88mm) of armor angled 30* at 1000yds and 3.0” at 2,000yds. The M79 AP solid could penetrate 3.6” (92mm) of armor angled 30* at 1,000yds and 2.5” at 2,000yds. The HV M93 APCR shot could penetrate 5.3” of armor angled 30* at 1000yds and 3.9” at 2,000yds (98mm). The maximum safe ROF was 15 rounds per minute. On a carriage, the towed version weighed 4,875#.

In Italy, in the month of December alone, each battalion averaged 15,000 rounds in indirect fire missions. The TDs fired so many HE rounds there was a temporary shortage
The 3” HE shell had a longer range then the 105mm medium howitzer, and did less cratering damage to roads. The HE shell was also effective in direct fire against machinegun nests and anti-tank guns.

In the last 2 days of January 1944, the TDs of the 601, supporting 3rd Infantry Division, knocked out a Tiger with 3 rounds of AP, at a range of 1,000yds. During the fighting on the Anzio beachhead, the 601 accounted for 43 Panzers, but only lost 3 destroyers! Another Tiger was destroyed on February 3rd, at a range of 600yds by a M10 from the 894th, supporting a battalion of the Irish Guards.

On 19 February, 2 Tigers and 5 PzIVs were killed for no loss by M10s of the 701st

During the fighting around Cassino, a M10 from the 776th was asked to destroy a 50mm ATG on the 3rd floor of a house. The catch was there were US troops on the first floor. 4 rounds later, the gun was destroyed and the troopers were unharmed.

On 23 May, a M10 of Company A, 701st, supporting 1st Armored, destroyed 2 Tigers. Carefully firing an AP shot into the mantlet of each tank, the gunner locked the Tigers turrets in place, and then they were set on fire with HE shells. During the day’s fighting, A/701 knocked out 8 panzers total, losing 1 M10 to direct fire, and 2 to mines.

Perhaps the most unlikely Tiger kill came on 24 May, a Tiger was spotted pulling out of a barn. The newly replaced main gun was inoperative due to a missing firing pin, but tracers from the 50cal set on fire hay-bales that had been wired to the hull to provide camouflage. The burning Tiger backed out of sight into the barn, it was later found with an exploded gas tank.
Now in Normandy, the 899th, a battalion of M10s, was engaged in fighting off the attack by Panzer Lehr. The first encounter with Panthers for the TD men, they still killed 12 Panthers and a PzIV.

On 7 August, 1st Platoon, A/823rd, set up a roadblock with elements of the 120th Infantry Regiment. Later that day they were rushed by a group of German armor. Firing at a range of 2,000yds, they destroyed 3 tanks, 4 armored cars, and four halftracks. Crews reported hitting more vehicles, but they were retrieved by the Germans.

Outside Chambois, on August 20, 2 platoons from A/773 destroyed a Panther, 7 PzIVs, 19 halftracks, 29 trucks, 19 command cars and Volkswagens and rounded up 900 prisoners, for the cost of 2 men wounded. Inside Chambois proper, 2nd Platoon C/773 had a field day with the fleeing Germans, they picked off 11 PzIVs, 3 Panthers, 5 PzIIIs, 3 assault guns, and many other vehicles. The #4 gun alone knocked out 8 panzers and assault guns and 26 other vehicles. The crew fired 3 basic loads of ammo. The platoon reported 500 Germans dead and 100 taken prisoner. Between them, the 776th and the 607th (towed) destroyed 103 tanks and SP guns, and 150 halftracks and other vehicles during the fighting around Chambois in late August.

In their first 2 weeks in France, the 645th encountered scattered German armor, taking 2 Tigers, 1 Panther, 1 PzIV, 1 PzIII, and 1 SP gun for 2 M10s and 8 armored cars.

1 September, 2 M10s in Meximieux, under attack by 5 Panthers from the 11th Panzer, destroyed 4 to no loss. One Panther, accidentally shot with a HE shell, crashed into a building after the hit destroyed the driver’s periscope. By the end of the day, 8 medium tanks, 4 light tanks, 3 assault guns, and seven other vehicles were knocked out, and 130 Germans were killed. The defenders lost 30 men killed or wounded and 2 M10s destroyed.

On 29 September, the 11th Panzer tried again near Arracourt, but the destroyers knocked out 13 PzIVs, 2 Panthers for no loss.

On 10 October, 1st SS Panzer attacked the 120th Infantry Regiment. One gun from B/823rd (Towed) knocked out 4 attacking tanks in 30 seconds, with 7 rounds at ranges from 1300 to 2300yds. Over 6 hours the entire platoon claimed 6 kills and disabled 3 more for no casualties.

On 19 Nov, the C/771st cost the 9th Panzer 18 panzers, but only lost 1 M10. 771 faced King Tigers on the 20th, losing 6 M10s (5 killed, 25 wounded), but taking 4 KTs in return. The 702, equipped with M36s, cost the 9th Panzer 24 tanks, but only lost 3 M36s in return.

On the second day of Ardennes, 1st platoon C/811th destroyed 14 panzers over the course of the day, losing 2 M10s in return.

In the fighting around Krinkelt, the 644th took 17 panzers, and 2 sp guns, and threw the 12th SS Panzer off schedule.

A towed platoon of the A/825th, defending Stavelot and down to only 2 guns, took 4 Tigers and claimed a King Tiger after it drove into a building while under fire. C/825, equipped with M10s, also destroyed 5 Tigers on 19 December.

From 19-26 December, the 705th destroyed 39 tanks. The battalion lost 20 killed and 5 M18s destroyed. C/609 took 15 Panthers and 1 Tiger, loosing 13 men and 2 M18s to direct fire. (6 more were lost to nightly bombing)

On 21 January, Sgt Rutledge (C/636) disabled a Tiger at 2000yds with 4 rounds of AP ammo.

A survey of 39 TD battalions in the ETO revealed that, on average, each destroyed 34 panzers and 17 towed guns.

Destroyer losses in the entire ETO were 539 M10s, 215 M18s, 151 M36s and 228 towed guns. Destroyer battalions in 3rd Army took 686 tanks (plus 239 sp guns) out of 3rd Army’s total score of 2,287 panzers.

The 701st, first TD battalion to enter combat, knocked out 87 tanks through the end of the war. The 601st, also fighting since Torch, claimed 155 tanks and SP guns, losing 110 killed and 572 wounded.

823rd destroyed 113 tanks (68 PzIVs, 27 Panthers, 18 Tigers)
773rd destroyed 113 panzers, 25 assault guns
702nd destroyed 103 panzers, 51 assault guns, at the cost of 60 men KIA
634th destroyed 68 tanks and assault guns against 28 M10s lost, 76 killed, and 175 wounded.
628th destroyed 56 panzers against 18 destroyers lost.

Andras · **Andras**

Source- Osprey's US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-45

One study about the Ardennes battles concluded-
3" M5 anti-tank guns operating on their own against attacking tanks- 3 guns lost per tank kill;
3" M5 anti-tank guns as part of a integrated infantry defense- 1.3 tank kills per gun lost;

3" M10s on their own- 1.9 kills per M10 lost;
3" M10s integrated with infantry- 6 kills per M10 lost;

3" towed guns failed to drive off attacking armor in 7 of 9 instances, M10 battalions succeeded in 14 of 16 defensive actions against German tanks.

Tank Destroyer battalion losses totalled 119, of which 86 were towed 3" M5 guns. Losses in the towed battalions ran as high as 35% in December alone.

The Ardennes signalled the end of the towed 3" M5 battalions in the ETO. By May 1945, only 4 battalions still had the towed M5 gun, compared to 41 M10/M18/M36 battalions. Of the 41 self-propelled units, 13 were equiped with the M18, the rest were either fully equipped with M36s, or a mix of M36 and M10 SPGs.

More Anti-tank stuff, from Ospreys WWII Infantry Anti-Tank tactics

Typical Target Tanks-
PzIV 50-80mm Front, sides 20-30mm, rear 20-30mm
Panther- hull sides 45mm

AT weapons-
US37mm- 36mm @ 500y, 15-20rpm
US57mm/Brit 6lbr- 73mm @ 1000yd/ 20* off angle, 12-15rpm
M9A1 HEAT Rifle grenade 75-100mm/ 250yds
M9 Bazooka w M6A3 rocket, 140mm/ 300yds

Brit 2lbr- 50mm @ 600yds, 20-22 rpm
Brit 17lbr- 109mm @ 1000y/ 30* off angle; Tungsten AP 231mm @ 1000y
Brit Boys AT Rifle-20mm @ 300y
Brit PIAT- HEAT 100mm/ 100y, 350y vs buildings

SU 37mm short- 40mm @ 500y
SU 45mm- 60mm @ 500y
SU 57mm ZIS-3- 145mm @ 500y, 20-25rpm, longest barrel of any 57mm gun
SU 76.2mm – 94mm @ 1000y
SU 14.5mm API- 35mm @ 100y, 25mm @ 500y, Tungsten AP 40mm @ 100y, 35mm @ 500y

Ger 37mm- 50mm @ 400y with ‘AP40’ series ammo
Ger 50mm- 85mm @ 500y w AP40
Ger 7.5cm- 115mm @ 500y w AP40
Ger PzB38/39- 30mm @ 100y
Ger 30mm HEAT rifle grenade- 30mm/ 100y
Ger 60mm over-caliber rifle grenade- 100-120mm/ 100y
Ger 8.8cm RPzB HEAT rocket- 160mm/ 150y
Ger PzF 1- 140mm/ 30y
Ger PzF 30- 200mm/ 30y
Ger PzF 60- 200mm/ 60y

Soviet AT doctrine-
Light AT guns positioned forward with infantry, in pairs, open fire at 600y, fire until overrun. Destruction of enemy tanks considered more important then losing the guns.

Planners calculated that 12x 45mm rounds were fired per tank kill, losing 1 gun per tank kill. 7.62cm guns fired 6 rounds per kill, and lost 1 gun per 2-3 kills.

Typical Kursk AT strongpoint built within a rifle company position- 4x 45mm guns, 2-3 AT rifle squads, sapper squad with demo charges, SMG squad, hunter teams with Molotov cocktails.

Against a tank platoon, at least 10 AT rifles, fired at sides and rear from 100y or less.

Japanese AT tactics-
Mainly, attack the infantry supporting the tank, if the infantry could be suppressed, then a squad armed with AT grenades and incendiaries could assault the tank. ‘Ten men for one tank’. The 47mm gun was effective at close range firing on the sides of Sherman’s.

Andras · **Andras**

Lorraine 1944
Patton vs Manteuffel

In September 1944 Hitler wanted to deal a blow to the advancing Allied army by cutting off Patton’s third army and destroying it. The advance westward had left Patton’s western flank exposed while waiting for the link up with the 6th army driving north from southern France.

Hitler planned to mass several newly formed Panzer Brigades under the leadership of Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel. In August, the allies had scored a major victory in the Falaise Gap, inflicting 300,000 killed or captured with a further 200,000 trapped on the Atlantic cost.

Under Hitler’s original plan, the attack would be carried out by the 3rd, 15th, and 17th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, and Panzer Brigades 111, 112 and 113. Further reinforcement would come from the Panzer Lehr Division, 11th and 12th Panzer Divisions, and Panzer Brigade 106, 107, and 108. The date of the counter attack was originally set for the 12th of Sept.

The German army was woefully short of artillery, having lost 1,316 of 1,481 pieces during the withdrawal through Falaise. The 11th Panzer division, widely regarded as the best Panzer unit on the Western front, had 50 Panzers available for the fighting in mid-Sept. As of August 20, there were only 184 Panzers and Assault guns in the entire Western Front for the Germans. More armor was rushed forward for the planned offensive; however the shortage wasn’t of tanks proper, rather it was of trained tank crews and experienced tank officers. The bulk of panzer strength in Lorraine was concentrated in the newly raised Panzer Brigades, against the advice of the Inspector of the Panzer Forces, Hans Guderian. Most of the new PzBrigades were formed around survivors of Army Group Center, destroyed in the fighting on the Eastern Front. PzBrigades 100-110 had 1 Panzer battalion, 36 Panthers, plus 11 assault guns and 4 flak panzers. PzBrigades numbered over 110 had 2 panzer battalions, one of Panthers, one of PzIVs, plus 10 assault guns.

The Panzer Brigades had been used successfully on the Eastern Front as a mobile reserve to plug gaps in the line and as a shock force against Russian infantry. The Luftwaffe had been withdrawn from France and about 110 fighter-bombers were assigned to the region.

The US Third Army was near full strength. The veteran tankers of the 3rd had found that the inexperienced Panzer crews would bail out of the tanks if hit with white-phosphorus smoke, or even HE shells. 4th AD implemented WP smoke as a standard procedure when facing Panthers. Even if the crews did not bail out in the face of the acrid fumes, they would be blinded long enough for the US tankers to flank the Panther and kill it, even with 75mm guns.

While the German panzer strength in the area never exceeded 350 tanks at one time, the 3rd Army started out with 165 M5, 600 M4(75), 76 M4(76), and 450 M10 and M18 tank destroyers.

In addition, 19th TAC air force was assigned to the 3rd Army. Its headquarters was co-located with Patton’s, allowing very responsive air-support. The 19th had seven fighter groups available. Each Group had three 25 plane squadrons. Most of the Groups were P47 Thunderbolts; only 2 squadrons were P51s providing top cover, as well as fast reconnaissance and forward spotting for the Corp heavy artillery. The 19th TAC had 20 radio teams deployed to subordinate commands within 3rd Army.

The Destruction of PzBrigade 106
During the 3rd Army’s approach and crossing of the Moselle River, German General Knobelsdorf thought he saw an opportunity to launch a spoiling attack against the exposed flank of the 90th Infantry Division. He thought he could turn the flank of Walkers XX corps with a tank assault much like those on the Eastern Front that had succeeded against Russian infantry forces. PzBrigade 106 had 36 Panthers, 11 JgPzIV/70s and 119 SdKfz 251s. Late on the night of the 7/8 Sept, the Panzers began their move. No contact was made until the HQ of the 90th found panzer forces driving down roads on either side of the forest it was set up in. One M4 destroyed a 251 before being killed by a Panther itself. Divisional HQ personnel alerted it’s battalions before attacking the tail-end of the German column. Instead of retreating as the Germans expected, American forces throughout the area began to methodically attack the intruders.

After daybreak, the left wing of the German forces began an assault on the village of Mairy, home to the 1st battalion 358th infantry, and a platoon of 3” towed AT guns. Panthers began to fire into the village from hills overlooking the town, but were brought under fire from the 3” guns and lost two of their number. Eleven 251s filled with PzGrenadiers tried to outflank the defenders by rushing into to town from the south, but two 251s were destroyed by 105mm howitzers, 2 were lost to bazookas, and 4 more were lost to the 3” guns. A Panzer column led by a Panther tried to enter the village using a sunken road, but the lead panzer was knocked out by an infantry team and, before the remaining panzers could extricate themselves from the gully, they were pummeled with 300 rounds of 155mm howitzer fire. 5 more Panthers and 20 251s were knocked out by the artillery. This fighting cost the 106th 7 Panthers and 48 251s.

Meanwhile 2/359 Infantry was sealing off escape routes, Divisional HQ was reinforced with tanks from the 712th Tank battalion, and 3/359 set up more roadblocks around the area. By the end of the day, 106 PzBrigade was finished as a fighting unit, down to a quarter of its manpower, with 764 men captured. The Brigade had lost 21 Panthers and JgPzrs, 60 251s, and more then 100 support vehicles. Only 9 of the 47 original AFVs were operational at the end of the fighting. Over the course of the next few days 17 Panthers and 9 Jgpzr were recovered or escaped back to the German lines.

Using tactics that had worked against the Russians, the 106th was destroyed with almost no effect on its intended target.

4th AD goes on walkabout
In a demonstration of classic American doctrine, 2 battalions of the 80th ID crossed the Moselle River north of Nancy with CCA of the 4th AD close behind. With the defending German infantry pressed hard by the attacking US infantry, CCA bulldozed through and raced deep into the German rear areas. They destroyed 12 AFVs, 85 other vehicles and some artillery. By the end of the day, the division threatened to encircle the defenders at Nancy. The 3rd and 15th PzGrn Division were committed to destroyed the American forces, but over the next two days did not succeed and lost so much manpower that all forces at Nancy had to be withdrawn or be surrounded. The 80th and Free French forces occupied Nancy on the15th of Sept.

Hitler’s plans for a counter offensive had been continually pushed back as the US forces pushed forward into the planned jump off areas. In addition, one of the planned PzBrigades had already been destroyed. To make matters worse for the Germans, PzBrigade 107 and 108 were withdrawn from the Lorraine sector to reinforce the defenders near Aachen in the face of the First Army’s advance from Belgium. After the destruction of the 106, Hitler ordered no more units planned for the attack were to be used until the counterattack was launched.

Disaster at Dompaire
While the US 79th InfDv pinned the German 16th InfDv by frontal attack, the French 2nd Armored Div Combat Command Langlade (GTL) shot the gap between the weak Kampfgruppe Ottenbacher and the 16th InfDv. The French tankers were soon well behind German lines and again threatened to encircle them. Despite Hitler’s orders to conserve the PzBrigades, PzBrigade 112 and a PzIV combat gruppe from the 21st Panzer were sent to clear out the French and prevent the collapse of the entire 64th Corps.

The panzer groups were strung out in poor positions reaching from Dompaire to the neighboring hamlets of Lamerey and Madonne. Col. Langlade decided he had to attack first, even though the Germans outnumbered him. GTL consisted of 3 battle groups, each had 15 75mm Shermans, 1 76mm Sherman, 3-4 M10s and 1-2 companies of infantry. The French positions on hills overlooking Dompaire gave them an excellent observation post. The fighting began on the east, with Panthers infiltrating through the woods taken under fire by a pair of well concealed M10s who called in a strike of 250 105mm rounds, stopping the advance. Langlade arraigned to have air-support overnight and now the first of 4 strikes that day arrived, pounding German forces in the 3 villages. Under cover of the air strike, French tankers moved to trap the Germans in the villages. The second air strike arrived around 1100. The French villages later reported that the air strikes terrified the Germans and a number deserted, stealing civilian clothes to escape with.

Next Langlade received word of 300-400 infantry supported by 45 panzers approaching his headquarters on the hills. However the German infantry halted abruptly, having found a store of kirsch liquor in a shed. A hasty defense was organized with a handful of tanks, M10s and towed AT guns. 5 Panzers were destroyed to no loss initially. The German infantry, finally on the move again, were stymied now by two jeeps mounting .30cal machineguns. The jeeps were later reinforce by two halftracks and routed the infantry. While this fighting was taking place, the third air strike rolled in, but was partially wasted on burnt out hulks. The Panthers trapped in Dompaire continued to conduct low level probes of the French forces, but well concealed positions allowed the French to destroy Panthers with flank shots. The last air strike hit around 3pm. A late evening Panther assault petered out under fire from M10s, losing 5 Panthers. During the day, 34 Panthers and 28 PzIVs had been lost, along with the infantry casualties. 16 tanks had been knocked out by the air strikes.

The next day, a final German assault on GTL, by 17 panzers and 240 infantry, was brought under fire by divisional artillery and stopped after about an hour of fighting. German forces then started to evacuate the area.

PzBrigade 112 lost 69 of 90 tanks, 350 dead, and 1,000 wounded. French losses were 5 M4 tanks, 2 M5 tanks, 2 halftracks, 2 Jeeps, and 44 killed, with a single P47 shot down.

The Tank battles around Arracourt.
When the Panzer offensive finally got underway on Sept 18, the objectives were to eliminate US forces on the East bank of the Moselle by seizing Luneville as abase of operations, the crushing the bridgehead at Pont-a-Mousson. The initial panzer advance smashed into the screening 42nd Cavalry group, but was delayed long enough for CCA 4th AD to rush to the screen, along with elements of CCB 6th Armored. The most potent reinforcements were 2 battalions of 105mm M7s and 183rd Field Artillery group. Artillery strikes held up the German advance for the rest of the day. The attack appeared so weak and disjointed that Patton had no idea that a major offensive was planned and continued planning his advance to the German border.

The next morning, what had been planned as a 2 brigade assault, giving the Germans a 4:1 local advantage immediately went awry as PzBrigade 111 got lost, allegedly misdirected by a French farmer. A US liaison officer ran into the back of a German panzer column, but went unnoticed in the thick fog. He got away and radioed in. An outpost of M5 light tanks was able to withdraw in the face of the panzers. A platoon of M4s attacked in the fog, knocking out 3 Panthers. 4 more Panthers were knocked out by another Platoon of M4s, who reversed back into the fog, and then destroyed the last 4 Panthers seconds later.

A platoon of M18s encountered the lead elements of PzBrigade 113. 4 Panthers were killed at a cost of 3 M18s. Next 113 ran into another platoon of M18s, from the 704th TD Bat, and lost 8 Panthers. By mid-afternoon, 19 Panthers had been lost to the M18s. Two M4 companies rallied to Arracourt, and destroyed 9 more Panthers for 3 M4s lost. Patton visited the area and talked with General Wood, who indicated his forces had killed 43 Panthers, at a cost of 6 crewmen killed, 3 M18s and 5 M4s lost.

Early on the 20th, eight panzers from PzBrigade 111 emerged from the fog within 1,000yds of the 191st Field Artillery btn. The 191 took them under direct 155mm fire, and with the aid of a few other tanks beat off the attack. Co C, 37th Tank Btn lost 6 tanks to a well executed tank/anti-tank gun ambush by a PzIV company while crossing a ridgeline. Co C reversed back over the ridgeline and waited for Co B to join up. After forming up, the 2 companies maneuvered to a better position and assaulted the PzIVs, knocking out 11 while losing another 6 M4s.

There was little fighting on the 21st, and on the 22nd, the panzers of PzBrigade111 managed to close with the Cavalry outposts in the fog, destroying 7 M5 light tanks. But the attack was blunted by a thin screen of M18s, and the fog cleared, allowing P47s to roam free for the first time in several days. During the fighting 111’s commanding officer was killed by machinegun fire. PzBrigade 113 was thrown into the fighting, but to no effect. By the end of the 22nd, the 111 was down to 7 tanks and 80 men, out of a starting strength of 90 tanks and 2,500 troops.

In three days of fighting, CCA 4th AD lost 14 M4 tanks, 7 M5 tanks, and 25 men killed. In return, they effectively shattered 2 Panzer Brigades.

Total 3rd Army losses for all of September included 49 light tanks and 151 medium tanks and tank destroyers. However, they were issued 392 tanks during this period. The Germans committed 616 tanks and assault guns to the fighting in September; only 127 were operational at the end of the month, with a further 148 awaiting repairs. 101 PzIVs, 118 Panthers, and 221 assault guns were lost.

Andras · **Andras**

M4/M26/M46 vs T34/85 in Korea

Source- Osprey's M26/M46 Pershing Tank, 1943-53
New Vanguard Series #35

When North Korean forces attacked, South Korea was short on anti-tank weapons, and the US forces were little more then light infantry. Even with the reinforcements rushed in from Japan, there were few medium tank units available.

By the time medium tank units were able to be shipped in from the US, the allied forces were already in the Pusan pocket. The units arriving from the US were the 6th Tank Battalion (M46s), the 70th Tank Battalion (mixed M26s and Easy Eights), the 73rd Tank Battalion (M26s) and the 89th Tank battalion, raised from scattered units in the Pacific with a single company of M26s. The Marines also raised a Tank Company from the 1st Marine Brigade (M26s).

These units arrived in Korea in August, 1950. On August 17, the first tank action between Pershings and T34s occurred. A T34/85 platoon rounded a hill occupied by a Marine outpost, and encountered dug-in Marine M26s. Expecting another easy victory over M24 Chaffee’s, the first T-34 blew up after taking 2 rounds of 90mm, the second and third T34s continued to advance, but were also destroyed. The last T34 beat a hasty retreat.

Army Pershings entered combat supporting the 27th Infantry regiment, destroying 13 T34/85s and 5 SU-76s to no loss in two days.

The poor level of training on the part of the NK tankers showed as they repeatedly fired HE rounds against the Pershings in many encounters. While HE rounds had been sufficient to kill M24s, they were lacking against the M26s.

By September, allied forces had over 400 tanks in the Pusan pocket, facing only 40 T34/85s. But MacArthur ordered the Inchon landings to cut off the NK forces instead of making the break out of Pusan the main effort.

Outside Inchon, Marine Pershings encountered the NK 42nd Tank Regiment. During the 4 days after the landings, Marine M26s destroyed 24 T34/85s to no loss. When the 43rd Tank Regiment was ordered into the fight, it lost 12 T34/85s, seven to Marine Pershings.

US Army studies concluded that the M26 was 3.5 times as effective as the M4A3E8 in offensive operations and 3 times better in overall terms. Less then half the tanks sent to Korea in 1950 were M26/46 tanks. 309 Pershings, 200 Pattons, 679 E8s, and 124 Chaffee’s were sent. There were 119 tank v tank encounters, 104 involving Army tanks, and 15 by the Marines. The M26/46 tanks were involved in nearly half these, M26 in 38 actions, the M46 in 12. Only 24 involved more then 3 NK tanks. 34 US tanks of all types were knocked out, including 6 M26 and 8 M46. Of these 34, only 15 were totally destroyed. In return US tanks destroyed 97 T35/85s and claimed another 18 as probable. M26s were credited with 39% of the T34 kills, the M46 12%. Half the engagements took place at 350yds or less. The longest successful M26 engagement was 3,000yds.

Easy Eights killed 49 T34/85s against 20 M4A3E8s knocked out (actually probably less then 20 E8s were k/o'd, that figure may include Chaffee's as their losses weren't broken out from the rest).

Andras · **Andras**

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Andras · **Andras**

US Army Study: Tank vs Tank in Late 1944

US Army's Ballistics Research Laboratory conducted a study of tank vs tank engagements fought by the 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions from August to December 1944.

98 engagements were identified, including 33 from the Ardennes fighting. The typical engagement involved 9 US Shermans against 4 German AFVs. Only 1/3 of the total involved more then 3 German AFVs. The average range Shermans inflicted kills on the panzers was 893yds, and the panzers averaged kills at 946yds.

The study concluded that the most important factor was spotting and shooting first. Defenders fired first 84% of all engagement, inflicting 4.3 times more casualties on the attackers then suffered. When the attackers fired first, they inflicted 3.6 times as many casualties on the defenders compared to own losses.

29 engagements involved Panthers and Shermans. The Shermans had an average numerical advantage of 1.2:1. The data showed the Panther was 1.1 times as effective as the Sherman in defense, but the Sherman was a whopping 8.4 times more effective then the Panther when on the defense. Overall, the Sherman was 3.6 times as effective as the Panther in all engagements.

At the end of the 2 weeks of fighting in the Ardennes, the Panther regiments had lost 180 tanks, or about 43% of the starting forces. Of the 235 survivors, only 45% were operational, with the remainder dead-lined due to mechanical problems or battle-damage.

The First US Army had lost 320 Shermans by the end of December (90 were 76mm tanks) about 25% of it's average daily strength. Due to reinforcements, First Army ended December with 1,085 Shermans on hand, 980 operational and 9% deadlined due to mechanical problems or damage.

4th Armored started it's race to Bastogne with 149 Shermans (13 were 76mm), with 15% of those deadlined. The first 100 miles were covered in 19 hours, the next 16 miles took 4 days. On December 26th, the 4th had 76 operational Shermans with 45 more deadlined. All of the newer 76mm tanks were operational, only the old 75mm M4s, which had covered up to 2,000 miles since Normandy, were down with mechanical problems. The 4th received 20 M4A3E8 (76mm) tanks in Bastogne as reinforcements.

Cribbed from Osprey's Duel #13: Panther vs Sherman, Battle of the Bulge 1944